Papers

German Reunification: A Quasi Ethnic Conflict

Irene Misselwitz

Irene Misselwitz, M.D., is a psychiatrist, psychotherapist, and psychoanalyst (IPA) based in Jena, former East Germany. Her main research interest is the influence of processes of social and political transformation on the human psyche.

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Attitudes toward the reunification of Germany vary according to individual biographies. For this reason I would like to start with some remarks concerning my personal background. I was born in October 1945, immediately after World War II, in the Soviet-occupied sector that three years later became the German Democratic Republic. The years leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany’s reunification, and the subsequent years have had a huge emotional impact on me—they have been a time of rebellion and new beginning. Like many others I developed a new courage and bravery as never before in my life.

Since 1989, I also have been reflecting on my own understanding of my German identity. I have always experienced my parents and grandparents as people who feel and think of themselves as pan-German. After initial doubts, the German reunification was therefore much more natural for them and for me than it was, for instance, for my adolescent children. Until the erection of the Berlin Wall, I had frequently spent my holidays with relatives in Göttingen and West Berlin. The Wall of course brought painful separations to our family, and these were continued by the immigration of both of my brothers to West Germany in 1970 and 1984. Many friends and colleagues also chose that path. My husband and I frequently chewed over the same question. We read Fleeing or Resisting by Horst-Eberhard Richter (1976), a copy of which was smuggled over the border by a friend.

It had not occurred to me—indeed it surprised me—to discover that over those 40 years I had developed a GDR identity. However, during my few visits to West Germany in the 1980s I had noticed a sense of identification with the GDR, which was in contrast to the feeling I had at home, where I had a very critical and divided relationship to the GDR.

My self-perception experienced three psychological surprises as a result of the big social changes that have taken place in Germany since the beginning of East Germany’s peaceful revolution in 1989.

1. First was a humiliating realization of how strongly I had been molded by the GDR. Because of my rather GDR-critical upbringing, I had always considered myself far more independent from external conditions than perhaps I really was. Over the period of change, I became aware of this and now accept that the new circumstances will change me again and that my awareness of them will again be naturally restricted.

2. I was confronted by my perception of my own German ethnic identity: After reunification we were suddenly perceived of as “Germans” or “pan-Germans” who are to be mistrusted and feared because of our own history. This is an experience that West Germans had already grown used to. During our first visit abroad after the fall of the Wall, a close Czech friend from Prague subjected my husband and me to a rigorous examination. He wanted to be reassured about our views concerning the German Refugee Unions, who at the time were demanding the return of German property expropriated in 1945 by the Czech and Polish governments. We were asked whether we acknowledged and regretted the atrocities that Germans had committed towards the Czechs. Only once this was clarified could our friendship resume as before. Prior to 1989, when both of our countries (East Germany and Czechoslovakia) had felt suppressed by the Russians, our different ethnic identities had never been an issue.

3. I was struck by the endlessly complex and difficult relationship between East and West Germans in all areas of life, despite some growing together in recent years. None of us were prepared for the multiple mutual misunderstandings, humiliations, and degradations that we experienced. After the dreadful massacre of school children in Erfurt in April 2002, I suddenly had the impression that Germans were, for the first time, reacting collectively. The numerous social explanations put forward for that atrocity have been discussed without either side apportioning blame to the other. Instead, one was reminded of the kind of solidarity and humanity that can exist in society. This is in contrast, however, to the attitude taken toward the right wing extremist and xenophobic riots of the early 1990s, which were considered uniquely a result of socialization in the GDR, despite the fact that similar events were occurring with equal frequency in West Germany. In fact, it was only in the late 1990s that the frequency of xenophobic insults and violent incidents started shifting towards eastern Germany.

Ethnic tents

Vamik Volkan’s metaphor of “ethnic tents” (Volkan, 1999a; also 2003, p. 51 in this issue) has helped me to understand better these startling experiences and feelings related to the social changes surrounding the reunification of Germany. Although Germans belong to a single ethnic group, it is my belief that Volkan’s concept remains very useful in elucidating the psychological conflict of unification. (It should be emphasized that I am discussing here only psychological conflicts, and not other aspects of unification, such as the economic question.)

During the 40 years of separation, very distinct large-group identities developed in East and West Germany. To use Volkan’s metaphor of a tent, we seem to have lived in separate ethnic tents or smaller “sub-tents.” During the separation, this was concealed and to a large extent experienced only unconsciously. The differences only began to become clear in 1990 once the border had opened and daily encounters between the two groups began to take place. The large-group identities of East and West Germany were not so unified and homogenous as the metaphor of a single “ethnic tent” might suggest. (Recently Annette Simon (2002) rather eloquently described the heterogeneous structure of society in the East.)

The tent metaphor nevertheless remains extremely useful for a general understanding. It reveals the psychosocial protection mechanisms that exist among large-group identities. These become especially important when a group is under threat. The German-German encounter has profoundly unsettled both sides. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why both sides consistently try to hide beneath their respective East or West German tent and repeatedly resist inhabiting the newly shared tent of a unified Germany.

German identity

The ethnic identity of Germany was deeply unsettled and damaged by the atrocities and crimes of the Nazi era, with the result that afterwards no one could be proud to be German anymore. This led first of all to paralysis and depression. The separation of Germany under the rule of the allies, though painful, came as a relief from the heavy moral burden of being German. Each side strived to be the better German, thereby remaining closely related. The GDR considered itself the rightful successor of the anti-fascist resistance movement and boasted of having achieved a complete de-Nazification. As has been revealed recently, however, this was not quite the case. Russification never really occurred as such, and the GDR never genuinely adopted the values of the occupying power. This may be attributed to the initially rather brutal methods of the Russian occupiers, the clear economic inferiority of East Germany, the old anti-communist tradition, as well as the impossibility of establishing day-to-day social contacts to the Russians.

In contrast, the Federal Republic of West Germany enjoyed a Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), and the import of democracy and American culture resulted in an effective redirection of society. This was characterized by the famous motto “look to the future,” which was a convenient way of getting rid of an unpleasant past. In 1952, Konrad Adenauer was quick to reject Stalin’s offer of German reunification at the cost of German neutrality, whereas the Volkskammer (the East German parliament), naturally obedient to Moscow, had fully ratified the plan. West Germany, considering itself the lawful successor to the former Germany, chose to sacrifice one third of its territory (the East) in order to continue what it considered to be the safer path towards NATO integration, although the official line denied that there had ever been an alternative. The economic boom seemed to be a God-given sign proving that the past was forgiven and could therefore be laid to rest. Increasingly, East Germany, which in everyday life carried more heavily the burden of the past, was blanked out from consciousness and tabooed. At times, this could be quite grotesque. For instance, a West German acquaintance of mine who has been living in Jena (former East Germany) for the past five years recently told me how after moving to Jena she joined a choir. The choir was rehearsing Johann Sebastian Bach’s St. Matthew’s Passion, and she confessed to me that at the time she had been quite confused as to why they were singing “our” Bach. Bach had always been her favorite composer. She was then ashamed to realize that Bach was born in Thuringia and had in fact spent his entire life in the “East.”

In contrast to this, East Germans have always had a very lively interest in the West and whenever possible followed its affairs on television and radio. To a certain extent, East Germans were already “living” in West Germany through television, but the image we held of the other side was quite inaccurate. I realized this when I found myself shocked to see how many cities in West Germany had been almost completely destroyed during the war. Of course I had a factual knowledge of the extent of the destruction, but my inner picture did not reflect that knowledge. When I visited Kiel, Kassel, or Giessen, for example, after reunification, I was shocked to see that there was nothing left of the beautiful old buildings that were featured on a set of cards I had owned as a child and had always impressed me (obviously a pre-war edition). Somehow I had pictured everything to be more beautiful and intact “over there,” believing that it was only us East Germans who had to carry the burdens and injuries of the war.

Both East and West Germans shared a common trauma: war debt and collapse. This trauma resulted in strongly differentiated birth myths for each large group, which were employed as defense mechanisms. The cold war intensified the isolation, and the Iron Curtain prevented dangerous escalations while heightening alienation. The Third Reich and its collapse were probably not equally traumatic for all Germans. Nonetheless this history is inextricably linked to the notion of German identity, both from a German and a foreign perspective. Therefore I find the concept of the chosen trauma especially appropriate.

Projecting unwanted aspects

In relation to this, a further thread of the tent’s canvas becomes important: a mutual externalization of disintegrated (rejected) evil self and object images. As noted above, the division of Germany represented a form of relief for both parts of the country. Via projection, each side could rid itself of its own dark debt-laden burden. It is obvious that the common trauma had to re-enter our consciousness again after reunification, along with a head-on confrontation with our damaged ethnic identity. Our respective one-sided foundation myths could no longer be maintained.

In West Germany, the student movements of 1968 had already initiated a broader social awareness and reflection of the past as well as of the Federal Republic. Such awakenings also reached the GDR at the time, but were only acknowledged by a small number of intellectuals and were limited by the restrictive political circumstances.

It was only after 1989 that a more complex and critical process of coming to terms with the past became possible in East Germany. Numerous cases of the Stasi (GDR secret police) protecting Nazis have since come to light. Other revelations, such as the extent of the economic disaster, came as a huge shock for people from the former GDR, a feeling no doubt aggravated by the presumptuous and self-righteous West German commentary, which suggested, among other claims, that the GDR was merely a continuation of Nazi Germany. This generalization is inappropriate and does not take into account the way in which the GDR changed during the 40 years of its existence. It has also served to exaggerate the disparity between the two German large groups.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent reunification served to erode established mutual projections; or rather, the projections were returned to their origins and forced into question. The wall that resides in people’s minds, however, remains robust and is not easily overcome.

Although there are non-psychological aspects to the West-East German relationship, I believe the psychological aspects are important. The recent conflicts bred of living and growing together have made differences in the group identities that developed over the 40 years much more apparent than when they were separated. Both sides see in the other their negative projections confirmed again and again, fearing challenge and constantly undermining each other. They mutually taunt each other and secretly re-evaluate themselves through this process. The expressions Besserwessi—a word play with “besser” (better) and “Wessi” (West German person) resulting in a modification of “Besserwisser” (know-it-all)—and Jammerossi (moaning East German) characterize this phenomenon. They reveal the extent to which both sides feel undermined and threatened by the reunification and why both seek shelter under their respective tents. Many West Germans, for example, have never visited the new federal states and do not find it strange that they have not. From my point of view, the deplored East German Ostalgia (nostalgia for the East) is to be understood in a similar way.

It is as if the East German and the West German large-group identities offer a double protection. On the one hand, they help repel mutual strangeness and insecurity. On the other, they demonstrate how we slip under the East or West German ethnic “sub-tent,” preferring to judge and fight one another rather than to gather under the larger communal ethnic tent. In this way we are rejecting and defeating the common trauma, as well as feelings of guilt and shame.

Without the continual ascription of mutual guilt and with the acceptance of a common history, there could have been an exchange between East and West and a new common regulation (a new constitution, for instance). The new East German Federal citizens would not have experienced themselves as being directed from above, as in former times, but might have felt stimulated to participate equally in the reorganization of the republic. We all know that we were not in a position to do this. Both sides underestimated how different the two large-group identities had become.

West Germans believed that East Germans would rapidly become “normal” citizens. The old die-hards would literally die and everything would be fine; the old Federal Republic would not need to change. This turned out to be a fallacy. East Germans are not inhibited or underdeveloped West Germans; they are simply different. One can see this in the following example: a West German woman without employment considers herself a “housewife”; an East German woman without income, however, considers herself “unemployed.” East German phenomena continue to be observed through West German lenses and misread. Being different is still mutually judged with hostility. A rare exception is the weekly newspaper Die Zeit, which seems to be observing events with two sets of eyes (see for instance Uchatius, 2002).

For me, the question remains why the West German large group reacts with such opposition. From my point of view, the insecurity experienced by East Germans is more understandable. It results from the collapse of an entire system, the inevitable integration into a foreign system whose structural foundations were laid without any East German influence, the revelations that emerged after the change, the devaluation of individual biographies (because skills and experiences once considered important in the GDR are no longer considered relevant), the existing imbalance in wages, and the under-representation of East Germans at executive levels, as well as in the media.

Why do West Germans frequently react just as aggressively destructive towards East Germans as East Germans toward West Germans? Three possible explanations occur to me:

1. There may be substantial guilt feelings on the part of West Germans concerning the preferential treatment they received relative to East Germans. Along with the entire territory of East Germany, these could be eliminated from consciousness to a large extent during the period of division. Destructive reactions toward East Germans presumably served as a defense mechanism against these guilt feelings.

2. Even in West Germany, despite the enormous benefits gained through reunification—through property, land purchases, and the take-over of Eastern companies, for instance—prosperity has diminished. The need for large financial transfers, supported by local governments, continues to this day. Suddenly there are more mouths to be fed in the German family than before, and it is simply hard to share.

3. Perhaps they feel the effects of a repressed mourning process. Not only do East Germans have to come to terms with the loss of the GDR—their familiar, although largely unloved system—but also, almost thirteen years after the fall of Wall, it is undeniable that the old Federal Republic no longer exists as it once was.

Internalizing projections

A further feature of ethnic identity is the internalization of negative projections emanating from other groups (Volkan 1999a, 1999b, 2003). These processes can be particularly well-observed among groups that are unequal—the weaker group incorporates the negative attributions into its self-image.

In Germany, the East Germans are obviously the weaker group. West Germans repeatedly complain about the lack of self-confidence, passivity, mournfulness, authoritarian patterns of behavior, and xenophobia prevalent among East Germans. East Germans in turn experience themselves within the Federal Republic as second class citizens. These attributes, though justified on occasion, are in danger of being reinforced rather than overcome, like self-fulfilling prophecies, as W. Thierse said in 2002.

We should remember, however, that in 1989, East Germans demonstrated immense bravery and civil courage when they overthrew the so-called “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” in a momentous revolutionary and democratic course of action. This was in spite of the fact that it was not clear whether or not the GDR political leadership would fall back on the so-called “Chinese solution,” characterized by the massacre at Tiananmen Square in July 1989. Clearly the East German creative potential has not been successfully harnessed in the reunification process. Instead, there was the promise of “blossoming landscapes” in a kind of “we’ll do it for you,” “we’ll show you how it has to be” way, which again reinforced passivity.

We need new, radically different development concepts to counteract the continuing alienation. I recently asked a school-teacher how psychotherapists should engage with society in order to prevent further disasters such as the massacre in Erfurt. She immediately replied that politicians should invest in improving employment opportunities and living conditions to encourage our young people to stay in eastern Germany. The stark reality is that eastern Germany is currently facing a second drop in birth rate because of the migration of young families to western Germany. As with any other, the East German large group has the potential to behave both progressively and regressively. There is a great danger lurking in the current regressive mode of many East Germans, which must be identified and countered.

Divided identities

A further thread of the German ethnic canvas describes divided identities. From my point of view, this is the aspect of our large-group identities that causes the most significant problems in daily encounters. Unconsciously, East Germans identify themselves largely with socialist ideals, no matter what their attitude towards that system was at the time. By this I mean a stronger orientation towards the community, the collective, and a belief in mutual assistance and cooperation. On the one hand, this was considered desirable by the government because it facilitated control and influence. People had learned to create an acceptable existence within their families and social niches. It even enabled them to withdraw from the sphere of government control and to compensate for the poor economy through mutual assistance. Individualism was scorned for bringing hostility and exclusion; invisibility was most desirable.

In Western society, the emphasis was placed increasingly on differentiation and individualism. To define oneself, to be able to sell oneself, to make oneself noticeable—these were the skills one needed in order not to sink.

This contrast creates discrepancies in everyday life and behavior in Germany today and leads to substantial misunderstandings that reinforce mutual prejudices again and again. Without critical and self-critical reflection, each side continues to regard its behavior as naturally right while secretly rejecting that of the other.

I would like to illustrate this with a few examples taken from the books Culture Shock Germany I and II by Wolf Wagner (1996 and 1998) that show how well known mutual negative attributions constantly reproduce themselves in daily life.

Architectural dilemma

Finally, I would like to draw a parallel from architecture that represents Germany’s identity struggles today. In recent years, the debate about the restructuring of Berlin has been very prominent in the media. Much of the debate has centered around the former Schlossplatz, the original location of the Berlin castle, which was bombed during the war and eventually demolished by the GDR government as a relic of the monarchy in order to make space for the architecture of the Republic of the Proletariat: the Palace of the Republic.

There are three concepts for the future of this site:

1. The “typical West German” concept, which is favored by the strongest lobby, calls for the demolition of the Palace of the Republic and the reconstruction of the Berlin Castle. This means undoing the barbaric crime of the East German government (which built the Palace of the Republic). It also means the replacement of one crime by another: again the attempt to eliminate and thus degrade a trace of history, GDR history. Most West Germans demonstrate a desire to completely erase any trace of the GDR in this central location.

2. The typical East German concept calls for the preservation of the Palace, not to re-erect the castle but to rather keep the existing conditions of holes and free spaces in the inner city. I have already reflected on the reasons for this concept, which I call “ostalgic.”

3. The path of integration, which does not feel obliged to either group, is favored by “intercultural” Germans. Studio Urban Catalyst, a group of young Berlin-based architects, has recently presented a concept for an interim use of a part of the remaining Palace of the Republic. The architects argue that a short-term appropriation of the structure regardless of its final use could “help to initiate a process of re-appropriation and cultural ‘decontamination,’ which is needed before a final use for the site can be found” (Studio Urban Catalyst, 2002). Even if the contested structure is demolished in the long term, events, discussions, and art projects on site would have helped to deal with it, avoiding the path of simple elimination and denial of history, and encouraging integration into something new.

We can well wonder which concept will actually be put into effect. Since there is no available funding for the first concept and no lobby for the second, there might well be a chance for the third—and from my point of view the best—concept to deal with the German-German conflict situation.

Concluding remarks

1. Our differently shaped large-group identities in East and West Germany are deeply rooted psychological realities that need to be recognized and also respected.

2. These identities have protective functions, particularly in times of insecurity and threat.

3. The on-going need to recognize difference disappoints the illusion of likeness.

4. The historical foundation of the two large-groups remains pervasive because it serves to defeat the common trauma.

5. The imbalance, the unequal evaluation, the unequal opportunities of the two groups was fixed right from the outset and throughout the process of reunification and remains a critical factor in growing together (feeding the potential for violence in the society).

6. The encounter between large groups inevitably takes a different course from a meeting between individuals.

7. Psychoanalytic reflection on large-group identity conflicts is crucial in order for us to make our own individual contributions, to gain awareness, and to come to terms with it.

8.A question raised by Annette Simon (2002) remains equally important for both large groups: after more than 50 years since the war and thirteen years since the end of separation, is there such a thing as a good German identity? And if so, how is it constituted.

References

Richter, H. E. (1976). Fleeing or Resisting. Reinbeck by Hamburg: Rowohlt-Verlag.

Simon, A. (2002). East German Identity in 2002. Lecture presented at the Lindau Psychotherapeutic Weeks, April.

Studio Urban Catalyst (2002). Realisation Concept for a Temporary Use of the Palace of the Republic. Published in the catalogue of the exhibition “Zwischen Palast Nutzung,” Berlin, November.

Thierse, W. (2001). Zukunft Ost. Berlin: Rowohlt-Verlag (in German).

Uchatius, W. (2002). Die im Osten sieht man nicht, (Nobody notices the East Germans). Die Zeit, April 18 (in German).

Volkan, V. D. (1999a). Das Versagen der Diplomatie: Zur Psychoanalyse nationaler, ethnischer und religiöser Konflikte (The Failure of Diplomacy: The Psychoanalysis of National, Ethnic, and Religious Conflicts). Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag (in German).

Volkan, V. D. (1999b). Bluts-Grenzen: Die historischen Wurseln und die psychologischen Mechanismen ethnischer Konflikte und ihre Bedeutung bei Friedensverhandlungen. (Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism). Munich: Verlag Scherz (in German).

Volkan, V. D. (2003). Large-group identity: Border psychology and related societal processes. Mind and Human Interaction, 13: 49–76.

Wagner, W. (1996). Kulturschock Deutschland I (Culture Shock Germany). Hamburg: Rotbuch-Verlag (in German).

Wagner, W. (1998). Kulturschock Deutschland: Der zweite Blick (Culture Shock Germany: The Second View). Hamburg: Rotbuch-Verlag (in German).